Have I told you lately how much I love the Racial Discrimination Act? I do. I absolutely love it. I’ll never begin to understand why my fellow conservatives don’t like it — longstanding grudges against minorities, I suspect — but the hatred of it from progressives is utterly baffling.
My favourite two sections exemplify how I think rights should be conceptualised: a synthesis of two competing, irreconcilable assertions by two rational and morally excellent parties. Here we go:
It is unlawful for a person to do an act, otherwise than in private, if:
(a) the act is reasonably likely, in all the circumstances, to offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate another person or a group of people; and
(b) the act is done because of the race, colour or national or ethnic origin of the other person or of some or all of the people in the group.
Section 18C does not render unlawful anything said or done reasonably and in good faith:
(a) in the performance, exhibition or distribution of an artistic work; or
(b) in the course of any statement, publication, discussion or debate made or held for any genuine academic, artistic or scientific purpose or any other genuine purpose in the public interest; or
(c) in making or publishing:
(i) a fair and accurate report of any event or matter of public interest; or
(ii) a fair comment on any event or matter of public interest if the comment is an expression of a genuine belief held by the person making the comment.
My love of these two sections is going to make my next statement sound particularly strange: Kanapathy v in de Braekt (No. 4) is a terrible decision.